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Executive Summary
Famine has been described as "a catastrophic dis­
ruption of the social, economic, and institutional 
systems that provide for food production, distribu­
tion, and consumption" [von Braun et al. 1998], 
Famines have occurred in every part of the world 
throughout history, and the 21st century is no ex­
ception. Millions of people, mainly in Africa, still 
suffer food shortages and occasionally face famine. 
Famine can occur not only when insufficient food 
is available, but also when people do not have ade­
quate "entitlements" to access food [Sen 1981).
From its independence in 1964 through the 1980s, 
Malawi was a self-sufficient producer of maize in 
nondrought years [Oygard et al. 2003). Since 2001, 
however, Malawi has depended on commercial im­
ports and food aid to meet its national needs. 
Although the 1991/1992 harvest was half the size of 
the 2000/ 2001  maize harvest, no food crisis oc­
curred in 1992. To understand what caused changes 
in national food sovereignty and household food 
security between 1991 and 2001 and the events of 
the 2 0 0 2  famine in Malawi, this case study reviews 
the decisions, events, and policies before, during, 
and after the 2 0 0 2  famine from four angles: availa­
bility of food, access to food, underlying poverty, 
and political and institutional issues.
The availability of food was affected by flooding, 
transportation bottlenecks, the sale of the govern­
ment's reserve grains in 2001, and poor crop esti­
mates. Access to food was restricted for some 
because grain did not reach the most rural areas, 
and prices soared, making white maize, the staple 
food, too expensive for many to buy. Underlying 
poverty was also a factor: 65 percent of Malawians 
live below the poverty line, HIV/AIDS levels are 
climbing, and purchasing power dropped in the 
1990s, making many people more vulnerable to 
production shocks and overcoming their coping 
strategies. Finally, political and institutional issues, 
such as liberalization of the grain parastatal, the 
absence of safety nets, and strained relations 
between the government of Malawi and donors, 
contributed to the famine.
This case study evaluates the best strategies to pur­
sue national food sovereignty and household food 
security and analyzes policies that can prevent
famine while meeting longer-term development 
needs— an effort that is necessary to prevent 
future famines and decrease poverty. It also 
explores how food availability and access can be 
assured for remote regions and the poorest citizens 
and considers whether government interventions 
or free markets offer the best approach to achiev­
ing short- and long-term national food sovereignty 
and household food security.
Your assignment is to  assess the effectiveness of 
the actions taken by the government of Malawi in 
2 0 0 2 , identify policy failures and successes, and 
suggest actions and policy measures that should be 
put in place by the government, food aid donors, 
and the private sector to effectively prevent future 
famines while striving for long-term national food 
sovereignty and household food security.1
Background
Between 2001 and 2 0 0 6 , six countries in Southern 
Africa— Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe— each contended with food 
shortages. In 2 0 0 2  food shortage led to famine in 
Malawi, its worst disaster since the Nyasaland 
famine of 1949 [Devereux 2002). Malawi was the 
only country out of the six to report deaths 
caused by hunger.
Malawi is a landlocked country of about 12 million 
people in Southern Africa. It borders Zambia, 
Tanzania, and Mozambique and is almost the size of 
Pennsylvania [CIA 2006). The population grows at 
2 percent annually, average life expectancy is 41 
years and declining, and the infant mortality rate is 
103 deaths per 1 ,000 live births. The literacy rate is 
62.7 percent, and 65 percent of Malawians live 
below the poverty line [Oygard et al. 2003). 
HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence of 14.2 percent 
among the adult population, is the cause of
'National food sovereignty exists when a country has the 
means to acquire enough food, whether from national 
production or imports, to achieve household food 
security. Household food security "exists when all people 
o f a household, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life" [FAO 2007).
declining life expectancy. Per capita gross domestic 
product [GDP] is U S$600, and overall GDP is 
US$7,692 billion. Although real per capita GDP 
rose throughout the 1990s, the level of poverty 
increased [Oygard et al. 2003],
Malawi is generally divided into three regions'— 
northern, central, and southern. The northern 
region consists of highlands and is less populated 
than the southern region, which contains the coun­
try's highest population density [Malawi National 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee 2005]. The 
central region, which contains the capital, Lilongwe, 
has a mix of rural and urban residents and contains 
most of the country's poor [Sahley et al. 2005]. 
The flooding and the famine deaths both occurred 
in the south and central regions.
Agriculture is the foundation of employment and 
the economy. M ore than one-third of GDP comes 
from agriculture, and an additional one-fifth of 
GDP is related to distribution and retailing of agri­
cultural products. Eighty-five percent of the popu­
lation lives in rural areas, and 75 percent of the 
population relies on agriculture for their livelihoods 
[Oygard et al. 2003], Landholding is split between 
smallholders, who typically own 0.23 hectare, and 
large estate owners who grow tea, cotton, sugar, 
and burley tobacco for export. Agricultural 
exports account for 9 0  percent of foreign 
exchange earnings [Oygard et al. 2003],
Although the majority of citizens grow and con­
sume white maize almost exclusively, most rural 
Malawian households are net purchasers of maize 
[Sahley et al. 2005], About one-third of the popu­
lation is perpetually unable to produce enough 
food to feed their families for a year and must seek 
other sources of income to purchase food. Seventy 
percent of the average Malawian's diet consists of 
white maize [FAO 2006]. Farmers produce one 
rainfed crop of maize a year. Planting takes place in 
November/December, and crops are harvested the 
following April/May. The months before the har­
vest are called the "lean season" because this is 
when households run out of the previous year's 
grain and need to purchase grain on the market. 
This season is also when maize prices typically peak 
because the previous year's stocks are running low 
and less maize is being sold on the market.
Events of the Famine
In his 1981 essay "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on 
Entitlement and Deprivation," Nobel prize-winning 
economist Amartya Sen redefined famine as a lack 
of "entitlements," not necessarily a lack of food. In 
his entitlement theory, Sen explains that a person 
can starve not only when he or she cannot produce 
enough food, but also when he or she does not 
have the means to exchange labor, money, or other 
goods for food, or when he or she faces a combi­
nation of these circumstances [Sen 1981], With this 
theory in mind, this case study considers the 2 0 0 2  
Malawi famine from four angles— availability of 
food, access to food, underlying poverty, and 
political and institutional issues.
Availability of Food
Malawi experienced good harvests in 1998/1999 and 
1999/2000, but the 2000/ 2001  maize harvest was 
8 percent below the 10-year average [Figure l].2 The 
four main factors that led to reduced food availa­
bility for some Malawian populations in 2 0 0 2  were 
poor maize production in 2000/ 2001 , transport 
bottlenecks for imported food, poor estimates of 
alternative food levels, and reduced maize levels in 
the Strategic Grain Reserve [SGR],
Poor Maize Production. From independence in 1964 
through the 1980s, Malawi was a self-sufficient 
producer of maize in nondrought years [Oygard et 
al. 2003], In the 1990s, however, maize yields fell 
owing to declining soil fertility. Maize is grown on 
the same fields year after year with minimal organic 
or inorganic fertilizer, which causes soils to be 
stripped of their nutrients and, eventually, 
degraded. In February 2001 13 out of Malawi's 27 
districts experienced serious flooding, which was 
also a factor in the decrease in production [Oygard 
et al. 2003],
Another factor leading to poor maize production 
was the fact that farmers reduced the amount of 
inputs they used because of lack of access to 
credit, liberalization of the input market, and 
reduction of government subsidies on fertilizers 
and seeds. A  program called the Starter Pack Pro­
gram [later called the Targeted Inputs Program or
2 Agricultural years are typically written as "1998/1999," 
because the planting season begins in the third quarter 
o f the first year, but the crop is not harvested until the 
second quarter o f the following year.
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TIP] was initiated in 1998/1999, with distribution to  
2.8 million households. "Starter packs" were allo­
cated at no charge to  farmers and contained 
enough chemical fertilizer and maize and pulse seed 
to cultivate 0.1 hectare [Rubey 2003], The program 
aimed to provide farmers with free inputs to  ease 
the effects of reduced fertilizer subsidies, combat 
soil degradation, increase yields, diversify planting 
with improved varieties, and lead to  overall food 
security [Oygard et al. 2003], Owing to  donor 
concerns about the sustainability of the program, it 
was downsized, and by 2001 only 1 million house­
holds received these packs.
Low yields contributed to  grain shortages as well. 
The area planted in maize in Malawi is between 1.3 
and 1.5 million hectares. Yields are about 1,000 
kilograms [kg] per hectare, meaning that between 
1.3 and 1.5 million metric tons are produced each 
year. This production falls short of the estimated 
1.7 million metric tons needed for national con­
sumption and results in chronic deficits [Devereux 
2002],
Transportation Bottlenecks. Because Malawi is a 
landlocked country, all food imports must be 
brought in by truck or train, and this situation 
delayed the arrival o f maize imports in 2 0 0 2 . The 
railway line between Mozambique and Malawi was 
damaged by floods, and a train derailment on the
South African-Zimbabwe border disturbed train 
traffic for several weeks. Secondary and tertiary 
roads in Malawi were also damaged by floods and 
slowed the distribution of food to  rural areas 
[Devereux 2002].
Poor Estimates o f  C rain Production. Reliable statis­
tics on national agricultural production are neces­
sary so that the government, donors, and the pri­
vate sector can make sound decisions about im­
porting, buying, and selling grain. The Malawi 
Ministry o f Agriculture and Irrigation [MAI] and 
the Famine Early Warning System Network [FEWS 
NET] funded by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development [USAID] both release figures on pro­
duction of grains and roots. A fter the flood in 
February 2001, FEWS NET and the MAI revised 
their maize crop estimates, showing a decrease in 
yields from the year before. In July 2001 FEWS 
NET predicted that Malawi would have a food sur­
plus owing to  high cassava and sweet potato pro­
duction, which would compensate for the loss of 
maize due to  the floods [Oygard et al. 2003], This 
prediction proved to  be inaccurate and caused a 
critical delay in the government's and donors' reac­
tion to  the crisis [Devereux 2003].
Reduced N ational Reserves. The National Food 
Reserve Agency [NFRA] is responsible for stocking 
grain and protecting Malawians against fluctuations
in food production, availability, and prices [Sahley 
et al. 2005). Since 1999 the NFRA has been an 
independent trust that runs the SGR on a cost- 
recovery basis. For three years before 2001, official 
maize stocks were high, but the NFRA accrued 
millions of dollars in loans to buy and store this 
maize and was losing money by holding these 
stocks. Storage of grain is costly, and losses from 
spoilage are high. The International Monetary Fund 
[IMF] recommended that the NFRA sell about 
6 0 %  of the grain from the SGR to repay some of 
its loans and hold a smaller reserve so that the 
large stockpile did not distort market prices 
[Devereux, 2002). In addition, the IMF recom­
mended that instead of dumping this excess grain 
on local markets and altering local prices, the 
NFRA sell its grain internationally. The NFRA fol­
lowed this advice only partially. Instead of selling 
half of the reserves, it sold almost all of them, on 
both domestic and international markets. In 
July/August 2 0 0 0 ,  the SGR held 175,000 metric 
tons, but by mid-2001 virtually all of its stocks had 
been sold [Sahley et al. 2005).
A c ce ss  to  F o o d
According to Sen's entitlement theory, famine 
occurs when people do not have access to food or 
the means to buy it. The main problems behind the 
inaccessibility of food in 2 0 0 2  were poor distribu­
tion, high food prices, and low purchasing power, 
which put maize out of reach for poorer 
Malawians.
Purchasing power for Malawians dropped in the 
1990s, partly because of the devaluation of the 
Malawi kwacha [MK), which increased domestic 
prices of imports and led to higher prices for agri­
cultural outputs, higher food prices, and higher
unemployment. Even though most rural Malawian 
households are maize producers, they are net pur­
chasers of maize, because the amount they grow 
does not meet their household's needs [Sahley et al. 
2005). In most years maize prices are lowest after 
the harvest in June/July and rise about 5 0 -1 0 0  
percent through December. In December-February 
prices can spike even higher. Between May 2001 
and January 2 0 0 2 , maize prices rose by 4 5 0  per­
cent [Oygard et al. 2003). When people could 
afford to , they bought maize in a panic, driving up 
prices even more. Poor Malawians who could not 
afford to buy maize when their own supplies ran 
out were forced to sell assets, including livestock, 
to buy food. Table 1 shows the falling relative value 
of livestock between February 2001 and February 
2 0 0 2 , which was one of the most critical months 
of the famine.
ADM ARC. The Agricultural Development Market­
ing Corporation [ADMARC), Malawi's agricultural 
marketing parastatal, was established after World 
War II and historically held a monopoly on selling 
inputs like fertilizer, seeds, and farm implements to 
Malawians. In addition, ADMARC was the sole 
buyer and seller of maize. Prices were set jointly by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of 
Finance. In the 1970s and 1980s, ADMARC [and 
African parastatals in general) came under fire for 
being "corrupt, rent seeking and subsidizing indus­
try or cheap prices for urban consumers, while not 
paying farmers based on the actual production 
costs" [Bates 1981, as cited in Sahley et al. 2 0 0 5 , 
46). In 1987, based on pressure from the World 
Bank and IMF, the government of Malawi allowed 
private traders to sell maize, ending ADMARC's 
monopoly.
Table 1: Livestock Prices, M ch in ji D istrict, 2001-2002
Type of Livestock Price in February 2001 [MK] Price in February 2002 [MK]
Chickens 90-150 25-70
Goats 500-1,000 150-500
Pigs 900-1,800 300-1,000
Cattle 6,000-15,000 1,500-4,000
Source: Kamowa 2002.
ADMARC is still in a transition from having central 
control over the maize market to  operating within 
a liberalized, free market system. In 2 0 0 2  
ADMARC retained about a 10 percent market 
share, but it has more influence in the grain market 
owing to its historic role [Devereux 2002). In 2001 
the government was forced to take on loans owed 
by ADMARC and the NFRA, making up about 
2.75 percent of GDP [World Bank 2003). 
ADMARC decided not to buy maize from farmers 
during the 2000/ 2001  season, because there had 
been a bumper harvest in 1999/2000 and market 
supplies had been high. In 2001, when the govern­
ment realized that the initial reports of maize and 
root production were inaccurate and that the SGR 
was low, ADMARC announced that it would inter­
vene and purchase maize from domestic and inter­
national sources to resell it to those who needed to 
buy maize. By the time ADMARC made this deci­
sion, however, it had a difficult time locating maize 
for purchase, and it was forced to  buy maize re­
gionally at a higher price and ration the quantity 
sold to citizens. It also faced transport problems 
[Devereux 2002).
ADMARC also influences access to food by setting 
a standard market price for maize. In 2001/2002 
ADMARC set a price of l7MK/kg for maize. This 
price was said to  be too low to attract the private 
sector to enter the market, leaving ADMARC to 
act as the sole importer of maize. Additionally, 
government signals were unclear, and private 
traders were not sure when or if ADMARC was 
going to import grain and sell it at a subsidized 
rate, cutting the private traders' potential profits. 
The coexistence of this public distribution channel 
alongside a free market created confusion between 
private grain traders and the government.
Urban Bias. Food access was most problematic for 
rural Malawians, because much of the imported 
maize remained in urban centers. Urban communi­
ties have larger markets and higher purchasing 
power than smaller rural communities. In addition, 
poor roads caused transportation problems, and 
the low price of maize set by ADMARC dis­
couraged traders from transporting it to remote 
areas [Devereux 2002).
Because Malawi is a landlocked country, it contends 
with large differences between export and import 
parity prices. When grain is imported into Malawi,
the price it is eventually sold for in Malawian 
markets reflects the original cost of the product at 
port, plus the cost of transport into Malawi, mak­
ing maize more expensive for Malawians than for 
people in neighboring coastal countries. When 
grain leaves Malawi, the price that export traders 
[only ADMARC in this case) pay sellers is lower 
than in coastal countries, because they must allow 
for transport expenses to get it to port. "Import 
parity prices in inland Southern Africa are double 
or more the local cost of delivery," according to 
Wiggins [2005 ,15). This price differential translates 
to lower prices paid to farmers for their produce 
and higher prices charged for imported produce, 
making food access an even greater obstacle.
Underlying Poverty and Vulnerability
In 1991/1992 Malawi experienced a drought that 
reduced maize production to 6 5 7 ,0 0 0  metric tons, 
less than half of the 1,589,440 metric tons pro­
duced in the 2000/ 2001  harvest [FAO 2006). Yet 
there were no hunger-related deaths in 1992. What 
changed between 1991/1992 and 2001/ 2002 to 
make households less able to cope with production 
shocks and cause a famine in 2002?
Between 1996 and 2001, the poverty rate rose from 
6 0  to 65 percent [Bookstein and Lawson 2002). 
Some of the factors that contributed to the vulner­
ability of the population were high HIV/AIDS 
rates, low education rates, declining agricultural 
productivity and soil fertility, limited off-farm 
income-generating activities, low rural wages, 
restricted access to agricultural inputs in the 1990s 
due to economic liberalization, maize production 
levels that failed to keep pace with population 
growth, and a decline in purchasing power.
A large share of the population experienced a 
decrease in income. In the central region of Malawi, 
more than 4 0  percent of farmers grow tobacco, 
but in the northern and southern regions, less than 
20  percent do [PMS 2 0 0 0 ). Smallholder revenues 
from tobacco, the primary export earner, dropped 
nearly 50  percent from 2001 to 2 0 0 3 . This decline 
was blamed on excess production growth over 
demand growth and decreased quality of tobacco 
due to new and marginal growers who entered the 
market (FAO 2003). Additionally, off-farm labor 
opportunities decreased in urban areas, neighboring 
countries, and tobacco farms (Rubey 2003). One
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Sources: 2001 data estimated from FEWS NET 2002; 2 0 0 2  data from ReliefWeb 2003.
source of income that Malawians had relied on was 
remittances from mines in South Africa, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. Until the early 1990s, these remit­
tances provided mostly southern Malawians with 
money for household goods, agricultural inputs, 
and investments in livestock. The loss of these 
mining opportunities affected not only the families 
who relied on remittances, but also the people 
employed by these families, who, with this added 
income, could afford to  pay hired ganyu, or paid 
agricultural labor, as well [Wiggins 2005]. Farmers 
rely on ganyu to  supplement their incomes for 
purchasing household food, and it is critical for 
household food security. The average rate paid for 
ganyu labor is M K 20/day.3 A t the time of the 
famine, food prices in some areas were as high as 
MK 4 0 /kg of maize [Devereux 2002].
The HIV/AIDS rate is 14.2 percent for adults. The 
epidemic exacerbates poverty, because AIDS- 
affected households have fewer adults contributing 
to  productive activities and more time is allocated 
to  "nonhousehold" management activities. Increas­
ing numbers o f sick family members, orphans, and 
foster children add more pressure to  already 
stretched resources o f social networks [Oygard et 
al. 2003],
Finally, availability o f land has become a constraint, 
especially in the more heavily populated southern
3 In January 2002, M K 1 = US$0,016 or US$1 = M K  
64.33.
region. Given that more than half o f a household's 
income is derived from food produced by the 
household, land pressure can have serious implica­
tions for food security [Sahley et al. 2005].
Political and Institutional Issues
The final set o f factors leading to  the famine was 
political and institutional. The government of 
Malawi was blamed for not ensuring entitlements 
to  its citizens by being slow to  react to  the crisis 
and not having a contingency plan or an effective 
and timely safety net.
In addition, donor-government relations were 
strained at a critical time owing to  corruption alle­
gations, which caused some donors to  pull out of 
the country and led to  a delay in responding to  the 
crisis. In November 2001 several major develop­
ment donors, including Denmark, the European 
Union [EU], the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, all suspended aid operations. Donors claimed 
that they were unaware of the severity o f the crisis 
until it was too  late. They said they did not know 
about the sale o f the SGR grain, they believed that 
ADMARC's commercial imports would cover the 
gap in food needs, and they were unaware that the 
roots and tubers production estimates were inflated 
and inaccurate. Owing to  mistrust o f the govern­
ment, donors insisted on trying to  confirm reports 
o f food shortages before acting [Devereux 2002]. 
Finally, it appeared contradictory to  donors that 
they were asked for food aid in the same year that 
the SGR exported large amounts o f grain. This
situation supported donors' suspicions that there 
was mismanagement and corruption in the 
government, making it an unreliable partner.
Effects on Households
It was reported that between late 2001 and mid- 
2 0 0 2 , as many as 3 ,0 0 0  people died from hunger 
[Devereux 2002). Toward the end of 2001, house­
holds resorted to eating low-quality foods, such a 
maize husks, roots, and sawdust to survive 
[Wiggins 2005). Rationing, which takes place in 
normal years during the lean season, went further 
in 2 0 0 2 , as some families were forced to eat one 
meal every four days. Some families could not farm 
because they were too weak or needed to look for 
food elsewhere. School attendance dropped in 
affected areas. Deteriorating malnutrition rates and 
heightened susceptibility to disease became a prob­
lem, and cholera caused thousands of deaths at the 
same time as the famine, because many people were 
malnourished and weak. Mortality peaked in Febru- 
ary-M arch 2 0 0 2  [Devereux 2002).
Stakeholders
The stakeholders in this case include the govern­
ment of Malawi, international nongovernmental 
organizations [NGOs), international donors, private 
grain traders, and the farmers and citizens of 
Malawi. The government is composed of numerous 
administrative offices and ministries, of which the 
most influential in this case are ADMARC, the 
NFRA, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irriga­
tion [MAI). The MAI influences the production of 
grain, and ADMARC and the SGR manage that 
grain once produced. They also control and influ­
ence certain sectors of the agricultural input and 
output markets. The overall goal of the govern­
ment of Malawi is to provide food security for its 
citizens, but it must figure out the best way to do 
that, including how much, if any, government 
intervention is needed. Private grain traders are 
eager to enter the grain market and are monitoring 
the government to see where, how, and if they can 
enter the grain trade as ADMARC pulls out.
International N GO s and donors had a large impact 
on the Malawian government in the months leading 
up to and during the relief and recovery stages of 
the famine. Although the IMF's influence on the 
sale of the SGR grain proved to be controversial,
the government still relies on external funding 
from the World Bank, the IMF, and individual 
donor countries for many of its operations. Main­
taining relations with these donors is therefore 
necessary for essential programs related to food 
security.
Finally, Malawian civil society, including farmers 
and citizens, is a key stakeholder. It is the food 
security [or insecurity) of these people that is criti­
cal for the functioning of the Malawian state. Since 
9 0  percent of the population lives in rural areas, 
farmers are scattered, and many live far from urban 
centers, where decision makers reside. This disper­
sion limits rural people's influence on policy mak­
ing. But given that more than one-third of Malawi's 
GDP came from agriculture in 2 0 0 5  [CIA 200 6 ), 
farmers' needs cannot be ignored.
Policy Issues and Options
The government of Malawi has said it is committed 
to ensuring food security [Sahley et al. 2005). With 
its restricted resources, however, the government 
is currently not capable of providing either national 
food sovereignty or household food security. 
Therefore, adopting policies that ensure availability 
of food and entitlements to access food is the gov­
ernment's most reasonable option. An appropriate 
policy package should contain a balance of long- 
and short-term measures that help people through 
and out of a crisis toward long-term development 
objectives. According to the International Food 
Policy Research Institute [IFPRI), longer-term plan­
ning can be achieved when relief, recovery, and 
development projects are "combined and sequenced 
with each other in mutually reinforcing ways..." 
[IFPRI 2 0 0 2 , 5).
The following sections and Box 1 present multiple 
policy issues and options that address the problems 
of food availability, food accessibility, underlying 
poverty, and institutional dilemmas. These policies 
often have overlapping impacts— for example, poli­
cies aimed at improving food availability might also 
lead to poverty reduction. Conversely, the multiple 
effects of these policy decisions can cause unin­
tended consequences for different social groups or 
other policy outcomes. This section analyzes policy 
options on a continuum of short- to  longer-term 
options.
B ox 1: P olicy Issues a n d  O p tio ns  b y  C ateg ory  
A vailability  o f  Food
1 Liberalization of the market (A D M A R C  versus the private sector)
2 Strategic Grain Reserve
3 Targeted Inputs Program
4 Regional maize trade
5 Crop diversification
A ccess to  Food
1 Liberalization of the market (A D M A R C  versus the private sector)
2 Price stability
3 Rural infrastructure
4 Trade; growing of cash crops for income
U nderly ing Poverty
1 Socioeconomic development (education, health projects, off-farm  
employment)
2 Access to credit
3 Trade; growing of cash crops for income
4 Long-term agricultural development
5 Safety nets
Institutional Issues
1 Disaster planning and preparedness
2 Safety nets
3 Government transparency
4 Cooperation among stakeholders
Disaster Contingency Planning, Humanitarian Assis­
tance, and Safety Nets. A  country must declare a 
state of emergency in order to obtain international 
humanitarian assistance. Malawi did not officially 
recognize the food shortage or declare a state of 
emergency until late February 2 0 0 2  (Devereux
2 0 0 2 )  . Until then, there was no disaster manage­
ment plan at the state or regional level (Mano et al.
2 0 0 3 )  . Soon after the president's declaration, the 
World Food Programme (WFP) launched an Emer­
gency Operation (EMOP) to feed 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  people 
(WFP 2007).
Shorter-Term Food Security Strategies 2 0 0 7 ,4 was distributed through a consortium of 
international and local NGOs. Other major donors 
included the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), the EU, and USAID. Short­
term food aid helps avoid immediate hunger and 
suffering, but long-term food aid can cause disin­
centives to farmers and markets. Many donors and 
development practitioners are concerned that a 
country and its food-insecure populations can 
become too dependent on food aid. In 2 0 0 5 , three 
years after the 2 0 0 2  famine, it was estimated that 
the WFP was supplying food to II percent of 
Malawi's population (Sahley et al. 2005).
The WFP donated emergency food aid to Malawi 
beginning in 2 0 0 2  and continued to operate relief 
and recovery food aid programs through January
4In January 2007 the WFP continued non-emergency 
activities targeting food distribution to persons with 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, mother and child health 
clinics, programs for orphans and other vulnerable 
children, food-for-work projects, and school-feeding 
activities.
Since 2 0 0 2  Malawi has formed various task forces 
and groups, including Vulnerability Assessment 
Committees and the Joint Task Force [JTF] to 
coordinate the humanitarian response for Malawi. 
Another means of preparing for food shortage is 
creating more reliable information systems that 
compile local and regional crop estimates and 
market prices. Mali, for example, has invested in a 
strong agricultural market information system.
To mitigate potential food crises, the Malian gov­
ernment disseminates market information to part­
ners and private traders [Council on Foreign Rela­
tions 2005],
Even though the SGR, ADMARC, and TIP are 
often considered safety nets, they proved unreliable 
in 2 0 0 2 . Policies need to create effective safety nets 
for food-insecure Malawians in the context of both 
rural and urban populations and limited govern­
ment resources. Programs such as local public 
works and food-for-work programs that exchange 
work for food or income to buy food are options. 
The advantages of such programs are that they are 
relatively quick to establish, can be targeted to  the 
poor, do not undermine development efforts, and 
do not distort market prices [Council on Foreign 
Relations 2005],
Strategic Grain Reserve. The SGR is perceived as a 
way to ensure food security in times o f food 
shortages or when supply cannot be obtained 
though other reliable channels. Questions of 
management, functioning, and financing, however, 
make the SGR an uncertain safety net during a 
food shortage. In the 2 0 0 2  famine, there was not 
enough grain left in the SGR to provide a safety 
net to needy citizens. Additionally, grain storage is 
expensive, and spoilage leads to large losses. Storing 
grain for two to three years can double the real 
cost of stored grains (Wiggins 2005).
Preserving large grain reserves can be a disincentive 
to private traders. Uncertainty about when grain 
will be sold or if it will be subsidized by the gov­
ernment has been shown to prevent private traders 
from storing grain (Oygard et ai. 2003). If private 
traders were assured of their role in the market 
and had a better market information system, they 
could be responsible for importing maize when 
needed. It is even argued that if there were no SGR 
or if the private sector were stronger, millers and 
farmers would have more incentive to store grain
and possibly even make the SGR obsolete. Alterna­
tives to storing grain are holding foreign currency 
reserves for buying grain, creating a strong system 
of preparedness for food shortages, and using 
futures markets (Mano et ai. 2003).
Should the government of Malawi keep the grain 
reserve or get rid of it? Is it justifiable to use the 
SGR as a safety net? If retained, how can the SGR 
be made more efficient? Should it continue to be 
subsidized? How could the government ensure 
honest accounting mechanisms and a system of 
checks and balances?
Targeted inputs Program [TIP], TIP has been criti­
cized as too costly, and its cost was the primary 
reason it was scaled back in 2000/ 2001. TIP is 
funded mainly by external donors because the 
public sector is facing other budget priorities, such 
as education and health. Some donors argue that 
free or subsidized input programs may have ham­
pered the development of efficient input supply 
services because they interfere with incentives for 
private sector investment. Also, logistical, financial, 
and management delays in public programs caused 
the input packs to arrive late to farmers and incor­
rect products to be distributed to certain regions, 
which reduced the economic returns from these 
inputs [Oygard et al. 2003). The fact that funding 
for the TIP comes from donors raises questions of 
stability and sustainability.
The government has argued for maintaining TIP 
because it believes that increased yields are neces­
sary for obtaining household food security. After 
fertilizer subsidies were removed, fertilizer use 
declined, and so did yields. Because the input packs 
have the potential to increase yields by 100-150 kg 
per hectare, they could increase household food 
security (Oygard et al. 2003). Finally, proponents 
argue that it is cheaper to distribute packs than to 
distribute food aid.
Free-input programs can improve food security by 
raising crop yields in the short term, but they can 
simultaneously inhibit long-term private market 
growth in the input sector. Should the govern­
ment and donors continue to fund expensive input 
programs? Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Is 
TIP serving as a social safety net whose elimination 
would harm farmers? What kind of exit strategy 
for the input program is reasonable, and how can
farmers be provided with access to  fertilizer and 
improved seed varieties after the program?
Fertilizer Subsidies. In light of the high prices of 
inputs, Malawi's declining soil fertility, and farmers' 
weak purchasing capability, another option for 
making inputs more available to farmers is fertilizer 
subsidies. Such subsidies would benefit fertilizer 
suppliers and farmers who would otherwise not 
have access to fertilizers. “Fertilizer transfers are no 
longer viewed as an effective livelihood develop­
ment strategy. It has instead become a critical part 
of the national safety net. The population is united 
in support of a fertilizer subsidy" [Sahley et al. 
2 0 0 5 , 41).
Reducing fertilizer subsidies was part of a structural 
adjustment program, but it proved unpopular, so 
the president at the time defied the conditions 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank and main­
tained fertilizer subsidies. Untargeted subsidy pro­
grams like this one, however, are costly, have a less 
direct impact on poor households than targeted 
ones do, and limit private sector participation. 
Some experts have argued that in the long run, 
investments in infrastructure and agricultural 
research to increase productivity have a stronger 
effect on the cost of inputs than subsidies do.
M arket Liberalization. Except for the government's 
intervention in maize [through ADMARC] and 
fertilizer and seeds [through TIP), Malawi's agricul­
tural market has been liberalized. Because 
ADMARC is only partially privatized, however, 
"Malawi is suffering all of the instability of the 
market but reaping none of the benefits" [Rubey 
2 0 0 3 , 3). A  chicken-and-egg scenario is being 
played out by the private sector and the govern­
ment. The government is reluctant to fully privatize 
the parastatal until it knows that the private sector 
has the infrastructure and capacity to respond to 
demand. Government officials fear that if the 
private sector is given complete control of the 
market, prices will be volatile and will increase and 
there will be a lack of maize in parts of the country 
at critical times of the year [Oygard et al. 2003). 
Obviously, the government does not want to risk a 
shortage of staple foods, so in 2001/ 2002 it chose 
to intervene, resulting in a budget deficit and high 
interest rates [RATES 2003). On the other hand, 
the private sector is unwilling to invest heavily in 
storage facilities, trucks, or marketing as long as
the parastatal exists and creates an uncertain envi­
ronment for the traders.
ADMARC's policies not only affect private sector 
traders, but can also impact household production, 
purchasing, and consumption patterns. For exam­
ple, if the price of grain is set below the market 
equilibrium price, households might shift from 
eating other staples like cassava to  eating maize, or 
they might be less motivated to plant or store 
maize. If the price is too high, however, it would 
exclude some consumers from the market.
Research has shown that countries in Southern 
Africa with relatively open markets are better able 
to fill food gaps than countries where the govern­
ment is directly involved or restricts private sector 
trade [Mano et al. 2003). The years after the 2 0 0 2  
famine in Malawi support this theory. In 2 0 0 3  the 
private sector imported as much as 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  MT 
of maize, about 8 0  percent of the amount the gov­
ernment imported that year [Mano et al. 2003). 
Thus, with the proper incentives [or lack of disin­
centives), the private market can be quite active in 
importing grain.
If the government fully liberalizes the market, it will 
be difficult to guarantee that people in the most 
remote areas will have access to food, given that 
incentives are low for the private sector to invest in 
areas where transport costs are high, surpluses are 
small, and purchasing ability is low. What role, if 
any, can ADMARC play in a fully or partially 
liberalized market situation? What policies could 
the government pursue to promote the private 
sector's diffusion into poorer, rural areas?
Longer-Term Food Security and 
Development Strategies
Self-sufficiency versus commercial crops. Various 
strategies are proposed for achieving national food 
sovereignty and household food security. Some 
policy makers want to strive for national food 
sovereignty by achieving self-sufficiency in cereals, 
given that Malawi is a landlocked country in a 
politically unstable part of the world. Self-suffi­
ciency in maize would mean improving maize 
production and diversifying food crops by, for 
instance, increasing production of cassava, sweet 
potatoes, or potatoes. It costs three to four times 
more to import maize than to produce it, so self- 
sufficiency could be an economically viable option 
[Devereux 2002).
O ther policy makers support market-based solu­
tions or trade to ensure food access and availa­
bility. One option for achieving both national food 
sovereignty and household food security is to 
expand the production of cash crops, like burley 
tobacco, cotton, sugar, and tea, for regional or 
international trade. This approach would increase 
incomes and allow people to buy more food, since 
rural households typically spend 8 0  percent of 
their income on food [Sahley et al. 2005], To be 
successful, however, farmers need technical 
knowledge about growing these crops, input and 
output markets for these crops, and infrastructure 
that could facilitate these markets. Remote areas of 
the country have not attracted private traders to 
replace ADMARC's closed markets, leaving some 
populations with no agricultural input or export 
market. Poor infrastructure contributed to private 
traders' reluctance to  enter these rural markets 
(RATES 2003). Another complication is that if 
small farmers believe growing cash crops will earn a 
higher income than staple food crops, they may 
not plant staple crops, which could lead to further 
food shortages (IFPRI 2002).
Since household incomes, foreign exchange earn­
ings, and the majority of jobs in Malawi all rely on 
agriculture, and given that most farmers are net 
food buyers, policy options that seek to improve 
household food security and stimulate the 
economy should promote increases in agricultural 
productivity (PMS 2 0 0 0 ). In the past donor 
programs and government policy focused on 
increasing productivity of smallholders, who 
produce 9 0  percent of Malawi's maize (Oygard et 
al. 2003). Improving poor farmers' access to tech­
nology that could reduce their costs and increase 
their yields could lead to better household food 
security. Achieving this would require a long-term 
investment in agricultural research. Other policy 
options include promoting on-farm crop diversifi­
cation [for consumption or export), creating 
farmer organizations, and strengthening rural insti­
tutions.
Trade. Policies that encourage trade can also help 
ensure access to and availability of maize. Cur­
rently, however, food aid causes market distortions 
and, as mentioned earlier, private sector investment 
is lacking. As a result, some people ask if trade 
makes sense for a landlocked country in a food- 
insecure region of the world.
Malawi does not have a comparative advantage in 
growing maize, so some argue that trade policies 
that allow for efficient and timely transportation of 
maize are best. As mentioned, current yields result 
in chronic deficits (Devereux 2002). Maize is highly 
drought sensitive, and given Malawi's agroclimatic 
conditions, other crops, such as millet, sorghum, 
cassava, rice, and potatoes, might produce higher 
yields. These crops, however, may not be socially 
acceptable, and they lack markets and processing 
facilities (Mano et al. 2003).
Countries with liberal trade policies appear better 
able to close food gaps through trade than those in 
which the government is most involved (Sahley et 
al. 2005). Regional trade possibilities exist with 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Mozambique does not suffer the same land degra­
dation or import-export parity that Malawi does, 
so a trade relationship with that country could help 
smooth Malawi's markets [RATES 2003). If infra­
structure for the maize market between the two 
countries is improved, the tobacco market, 
Malawi's largest export income earner, could bene­
fit from spillover effects. In 2 0 0 2  and 2 0 0 3 , high 
volumes of cross-border trade improved the 
availability of maize.
Regional trade could also benefit Malawi. The 
region's large size and agroecological and climatic 
variation all but guarantee adequate production, 
which could be traded, in part of the region each 
year (Mano et al. 2003). In some areas it may be 
more economically beneficial to trade across 
borders than domestically, given weak infra­
structure. Northern Mozambique and southern 
Tanzania are both areas of surplus production and 
could be reliable grain sources.
Socioeconomic development to  reduce live lihood  
vulnerability. According to Wiggins [20 0 5 , 8), 
"Widespread poverty translates into vulnerability; 
poor households have fewer assets and restricted 
options to cope with shocks." To combat this vul­
nerability, multisector development programs are 
needed to raise incomes of the poor, stabilize food 
sources and inputs, address HIV/AIDS, provide 
education, and promote off-farm employment.
In 2 0 0 3  there were 8 4 ,0 0 0  AIDS deaths in Malawi; 
the HIV prevalence rate is 14.2 percent for adults 
(UNAIDS). The effects of HIV/AIDS on food
security are threefold: it affects farm production 
and incomes, it undercuts the ability of households 
to  cope with shocks, and it affects national econo­
mies and governments. M ost studies conclude that 
labor-saving techniques and diversification of food 
production and income are essential for farmers 
and farm households affected by HIV/AIDS.
Assignment
Assess the effectiveness of the actions taken by the 
government of Malawi in 2 0 0 2 , identify policy 
failures and successes, and suggest actions and 
policy measures that should be put in place by the 
government, food aid donors, and the private 
sector to  effectively prevent future famine while 
striving for long-term national food sovereignty 
and household food security.
Additional Readings
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